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A growing number of researchers in cognitive science challenge the idea that we can 
understand the mind by just looking at the brain (Clark, 2008; Gallagher, 2005; Hurley, 
1998; Menary, 2010; Shapiro, 2011; Thompson, 2007). They argue that our 
psychological capacities are realized not just by our brain but also our bodies, as well as 
the complex ways these bodies interact with their material and social environments. For 
these “4E” approaches, our psychological capacities are ​embodied​ , or realized by our 
physiology and agency; ​embedded​ , or situated within environmental niches that support 
and constrain them; ​enacted​ , or reflective of our first-person activities of sense-making 
and meaning-creation; and perhaps even ​extended​  beyond the head by material and 
social resources around us.  
  
At the heart of 4E approaches is the idea that processes like believing, remembering, 
and reasoning depend upon resources beyond the head. The artifacts and cultural 
institutions we use to support these processes are forms of cognitive “scaffolding”: 
beyond-the-head structures that, when we interact with them, generate ongoing 
feedback loops that transform our cognitive profile in real-time by opening up new forms 
of thought and experience.  
 
An important recent development in 4E circles has been an investigation of how moods 
and emotions might be similarly scaffolded (Carter, Gordon, & Palermos, 2016; 
Colombetti, 2014; Colombetti & Krueger, 2015; Colombetti & Roberts, 2015; 
Greenwood, 2013; Griffiths & Scarantino, 2009; Krueger, 2014a, 2014b; Krueger & 
Szanto, 2016; Merritt, 2013; Roberts, 2015; Slaby, 2014; Stephan, Walter, & Wilutzky, 
2014). These works examine the many ways we regulate, organise, and maintain our 
affective life by manipulating everyday artifacts and spaces. We make and listen to 
music, adorn walls with artworks, consume drugs, wear specific clothing, and gravitate 
toward spaces and social groups to evoke and regulate different affective experiences. 
These practices construct “affective niches”: self-styled environments providing the 
developmental conditions for affective states to take shape and thrive. 
  
“​Affectivity Beyond the Skin​” is an investigation of some of the many ways affectivity can 
be scaffolded by resources beyond the head. Each contribution challenges the common 
view in emotion science that affective states can be characterized by focusing 
exclusively on internal states of an individual’s brain and body.  
 
Wendy Wilutzky’s “​Emotions and Pragmatic and Epistemic Actions​” rejects the idea that 
the intentional character of emotions — their being ​about​  things and states of affairs — 
is a representational feature of inner mental states. Instead of this headbound picture, 
Wilutzky develops a rich action-oriented picture of emotional intentionality according to 
which emotions are actions that guide our dealings with the world and help us learn 
things about it. As Joona Taipale’s “​Self-regulation and Beyond: Affect Regulation and 
the Infant-Caregiver Dyad​” tells us, one of the things we learn is how to regulate our 
affective states in response to the people and things around us. Drawing on an 
impressive body of developmental literature, Taipale convincingly argues that our ability 
to self-regulate affect is ontogenetically dependent upon the management and guidance 
of caregivers.  
 
Paul Elvers and Michelle Maiese continue these explorations in an aesthetic register. 
Elvers’ “​Songs for the Ego: Theorizing Musical Self-Enhancement​” develops an account 
of musical self-enhancement. He inaugurates a new research trajectory by showing how 
music scaffolds feelings of self-esteem and empathy, leading to richer forms of social 
interaction and interpersonal relatedness. Maiese’s “​Affective Scaffolds, Expressive 
Arts, and Cognition​” is a nuanced investigation of the power of expressive arts like 
Dance-Movement Therapy to scaffold new ways of inhabiting the world and relating to 
others. These arts, she argues, enable multifaceted and embodied “affective styles” of 
moving, speaking, and interacting that can be put to work in the context of therapy and 
peacebuilding.  
 
Jan Slaby’s “​Mind Invasion: Situated Affectivity and the Corporate Life Hack​” also 
explores affective styles — but instead of therapy and peacebuilding, he considers more 
troubling cultural and political implications. For Slaby, “affective mind invasion” occurs 
when an individual’s affective dispositions are scaffolded by their local subcultures: e.g., 
corporate workplaces, social web-based groups, academia, the world of sports, or 
police and military culture. Over time, individuals within these domains habitually — and 
not always with full awareness and consent — adopt affective styles normative in the 
domain in question.  
 
Alessandro Salice, Alba Montes Sánchez, Thomas Szanto, and Gavin Sullivan also 
focus on socially situated affect. Salice and Sánchez’s “​Pride, Shame, and Group 
Identification​” develops a subtle account of “hetero-induced” shame and pride. Against 
accounts that portray these emotions as essentially self-directed, their account shows 
how group identification, or the feeling of being interrelated with and evaluated by 
others, shapes the character and intentional structure of these emotions. Affectivity and 
group identification is also the topic of Szanto’s discussion of “​Collaborative Irrationality, 
Akrasia, and Groupthink: Social Disruptions of Emotion Regulation​”. Szanto addresses 
a lacuna in contemporary discussions of akrasia — most of which focus on individual 
irrationality — with his account of “collaborative” akrasia. For Szanto, core 
socio-psychological mechanisms of group-level akrasia consist of 
interpersonally-scaffolded processes of emotion regulation that generate “collaborative 
spiraling of practical irrationality”: affective feedback loops that reinforce irrational 
tendencies of group members and animate their behavior. Some similar themes are 
found in Sullivan’s “​Collective Emotions: A Case Study of South African Pride, Euphoria 
and Unity in the Context of the 2010 FIFA World Cup​”. Drawing upon ethnographic 
observations of life in downtown Johannesburg before and after the 2010 World Cup in 
South Africa, Sullivan develops a careful investigation of top-down and bottom-up 
mechanisms enabling the spread of shared emotions like pride and euphoria.  
 
Finally, John Michael’s “​What Are Shared Emotions (for)?​” is a brief but substantive 
discussion of shared emotions. Michael surveys competing accounts of shared 
emotions, arguing that these accounts are, in fact, not incompatible with one another. 
Instead of picking out a natural kind, the term “shared emotion” refers to a motley of 
overlapping phenomena worthy of further interdisciplinary investigation — a fitting coda 
to this wide-ranging research topic. 
 
It is our hope that this rich and varied collection will serve as the basis for new directions 
of research investigating affectivity beyond the skin. 
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